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2Introduction
South Sudan, the newest country in Africa has seemingly 
become China’s test ground for its foreign policy 
and security strategies. The complexity of South Sudan’s 
war of independence and subsequent secession 
from the Sudan in 2011 tested China’s ability to turn 
a hostile relationship with the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM), chaired by Salva Kiir, now South 
Sudan President, into a mutually beneficial one. 
The Juba-Khartoum conflict over oil transit fees resulting 
in oil production shutdown in 2012 challenged Beijing’s 
conflict mediation strategies and its ability to coordinate 
the volatile Beijing-Juba-Khartoum triangular relationship. 
In addition, before Chinese oil companies recuperated 
from the oil production disruptions, or fully came to terms 
with the complexities of working with the two antagonistic 
Sudans in their interdependent oil sector, a civil war 
broke out between the South Sudanese government 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement - In 
Opposition (SPLM-IO) led by former vice-president 
Riek Machar, further challenging China’s foreign policy 
and security strategies in Africa.
For China, South Sudan assays its long-standing foreign 
policy principles and development ideologies in Africa - 
the non-interference principle and the idea that economic 
development brings peace and security. But beyond that, 
it ostensibly unveils the intricacies of Beijing’s foreign policy 
strategies, especially the efficacy of its non-interference 
principle when faced with intrastate armed conflicts 
in Africa. In a space of three years, China’s position in 
the South Sudanese civil war revolved around strict 
adherence to its non-interference principle, urging parties 
in the conflict to seek political solutions, direct mediation 
and deployment of combat troops under the auspices of 
the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan. 
At face value, the shift from one strategy to the other 
suggests the absence of a coherent strategy, implying 
that Beijing is being opportunistic, crafting its strategies 
as it goes. Although it might be the case that Beijing is 
‘learning on the job’, its strategy in South Sudan is not 
linear but rather a deliberately convoluted strategy of 
‘parallels’. This article, accordingly, explores this strategy 
of ‘parallels’ and the implications it may have on Beijing’s 
future engagement with civil wars in Africa. 
South Sudan’s strategic significance to China
China’s response to intrastate armed conflicts in Africa 
varies with each country. For instance, while it vehemently 
argued that in Libya “there must be no attempt at regime 
change or involvement in civil war by any party under 
the guise of protecting civilians”1, it was largely silent on 
1- UN Security Council 2011, 6531st meeting, S/PV.6531, 
10 May 2011, p. 20, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/
POC%20S%20PV%206531.pdf
3military intervention by French Special Forces that led 
to the capture and ouster of Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire. 
As might be the case with the other global powers such 
as France and the United States, geopolitical concerns, 
domestic pressure for China to protect its overseas 
nationals, and an expansion of its economic interests and 
security concerns as its global power increases influences 
its response to foreign conflicts. But more importantly, 
contrary to the past, as China’s interests expand abroad, 
conflicts in Africa are increasingly impinging on its national 
interests. The implication is that on a case-to-case basis, 
depending on the strategic importance of a country 
to China’s national interests, there is an emerging pattern 
in its foreign policy and security strategy. 
To China, South Sudan is strategic for two main reasons: 
its oil wealth, and its strategic location in the East 
African region. First, as China sought to keep the engine 
of its economy running, multiplication and diversification 
of its sources of energy became a matter of national interest. 
Although the SPLM and China had frosty relations at first, 
in the years preceding South Sudan’s independence, 
China had successfully courted the SPLM, making a case 
that it was in the interest of both parties to maintain cordial 
relations. China wanted returns to its oil investments, 
and the government of South Sudan needed the oil 
revenue, the majority of which came from Chinese 
operated oil fields, and accounted for 98 per cent of 
South Sudan’s state revenue. It made sense because at 
independence, South Sudan had seceded with 75 per cent 
of Sudan’s known oil wealth, and the majority of oil fields 
that Chinese companies had invested in were located 
in South Sudan’s territory. As of 1 January 2014, South 
Sudan has approximately 3.5 billion barrels of proved oil 
reserves with an estimated value of US$38 billion based 
on existing oil fields making South Sudan’s oil reserves 
three times more than Sudan’s. The majority of that oil 
is under the control of Chinese state-owned enterprises 
such as the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC). CNPC has a majority stake (41 percent share) in 
both Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC) and in 
the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) 
(41 percent share), both of which are the major oil 
companies operating in South Sudan. Sinopec, another 
Chinese oil company, has a 6 percent stake in DPOC2, 
which makes China, South Sudan’s major oil investor and 
leading importer.  
The outbreak of the civil war in South Sudan in December 
2013, and its subsequent intensification resulted in oil 
installations in the Unity State and Upper Nile State being 
targeted, thus dragging China into the conflict. Oil fields 
in Unity and Upper Nile State were forced to shut down, 
and the Adar Yale oilfield came under attack on several 
occasions. Some of the shutdowns were so sudden 
and done so hastily that machinery was damaged 
and oil leakages were severe causing both economic 
losses and environmental damage. Apart from the loss 
of 45,000 bbl. /day of oil produced at fields in Unity State, 
“satellite images taken by the U.S. – funded Satellite 
Sentinel Project show[ed] that key oil infrastructure 
was severely damaged, including oil storage tanks and 
2- EIA. 2014, ‘Country analysis brief: Sudan and South Sudan’, 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 3 September 2014. 
Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_in-
cludes/countries_long/Sudan_and_South_Sudan/sudan.pdf
manifolds.”3 South Sudan’s plan to construct refineries 
at Bentiu, located in Unity State and another “planned 
10,000-bbl/day refinery in the Upper Nile near Blocks 3 
and 7,”4 with support from CNPC were abruptly put to 
a halt as the civil war intensified. The refineries had been 
meant to increase production and avoid further disruptions 
due to conflicts with Khartoum. As a result of the armed 
conflict, oil production initially dropped by almost 20%, 
and then due to falling oil prices (from US$110 per 
barrel in July 2014 to US$35 per barrel in January 2016) 
and escalation of the fighting, oil production further reduced 
to more than 40 per cent in 2014-15. South Sudan’s 
oil revenue also plummeted from US$7.4 billion in 2011 
to US$4.2 billion in 2016, bringing losses to both China 
and the government of South Sudan.
Second, apart from its investments in South Sudan’s oil 
industry, China views South Sudan as being strategic 
to its expansion into the East African region. This is partly 
because of South Sudan’s comparatively more developed 
oil sector, but more importantly because a spillover of 
the conflict from South Sudan into Uganda, Kenya 
and Ethiopia will effectively destabilize the whole region - 
possibly with the same devastating effect as the Libyan 
conflict had on Chinese interests in the Sahel region. 
In Ethiopia, China has extensive investments 
in manufacturing, infrastructure development and railway 
construction. In October 2016, the first fully electrified 
railway in Africa linking Addis Ababa to the Red Sea port 
in Djibouti was launched. The project was funded by China 
to the tune of US$3.4 billion. In Kenya, China began 
the first phase of a US$3.8 billion Standard Gauge 
Railway linking Nairobi with the port city of Mombasa. 
The railway is being constructed by a subsidiary of China 
Communications Construction Company limited and is 
expected to be completed in 2017-8. A second phase of 
the project will expand the Standard Gauge Railway to link 
Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan establishing 
what has been termed as the East African Railway 
Network. Both the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway and the East 
African Railway Network will connect the East African 
hinterland to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean maritime 
trade routes, strategically fitting into Beijing’s One Belt, One 
Road initiative. A spillover of the civil war in South Sudan 
into other East African countries will therefore jeopardize 
China’s regional and maritime trade interests.
Other factors that make South Sudan important to China 
are that besides oil companies, Chinese private and state-
owned construction and telecommunication companies 
that were active in South Sudan found their operations 
threatened by the armed conflict. Media reports suggest 
that more than 100 Chinese companies were operating 
in South Sudan in sectors related mainly to petroleum, 
construction and communications as of December 2013. 
Chinese companies with major projects in South Sudan 
at the time of the armed conflict included: Zhong Hao 
Overseas, a privately owned construction firm in Beijing 
built water and sanitation facilities, housing for government 
officials, a hospital and roads in South Sudan. State-
owned Sinohydro Corporation dominated South Sudan’s 
engineering and infrastructure sector; it also “provided 
a water plant in Western Equatorial, a thirty seven kilometer 
road in Malakal and highway construction linking the North 
3- Ibid.
4- Ibid.
4and the South.”5 China Harbour Engineering Corporation 
also won the tender to renovate the Juba International 
Airport estimated to cost US$1.6 billion. ZTE set up 
the Sudan Telecommunication Network through 
a €200 million loan from China Exim Bank6. Although 
some of the companies had completed their projects, 
the majority were forced to either suspend operations 
or scale down operations. 
In addition, there was growing domestic pressure 
for China to proactively protect its nationals in South Sudan 
because in what also turned out to be a repeat of the 
Libyan experience for Chinese workers: several Chinese 
companies had to evacuate their workers. For example, 
China National Petroleum Corporation “evacuated 97 
of its staff in December 2013 because of the conflict.”7 
In a statement, CNPC announced in December 2013 
that it was arranging for the orderly evacuation of its workers 
from the affected oil fields to Juba, the capital city of South 
Sudan8, as they were forced to shut down oil fields in the 
Unity State and Upper Nile State, which were controlled 
by Riek Machar’s rebel fighters9. As put by Luke Patey, 
the evacuation of CNPC workers from the Palogue oilfield, 
South Sudan’s largest oilfield, led to extensive losses 
in production, affecting both South Sudan’s government 
and CNPC because, as he puts it, “without Chinese 
and other foreign staff, a limited number of South Sudanese 
technicians… struggled to keep production levels high.”10
Finally, aside from economic implications of the intrastate 
armed conflict in South Sudan on China’s interests, 
the conflict tested Beijing’s commitment to upholding 
peace and security in Africa. At the Fifth Ministerial 
Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) China had presented the Beijing Action Plan 
(2013-2015) underscoring for the first time the importance 
of China-Africa cooperation in the fields of peace 
and security. A specific clause in the Beijing Action Plan 
acknowledged efforts of the Chinese government’s 
Special Representative for African Affairs, then Liu Guijin, 
who actively engaged in mediation efforts in Africa’s 
hotspots, and “welcomed his continued constructive role 
in peace and security endeavors.”11 It is not a coincidence 
that the commitment was made hardly a year after 
5- Anthony, R & Jiang, H 2014, ‘Forum: Security and engagement: 
the case of China and South Sudan’, African East-Asian Affairs, 
no. 4, p. 81.
6- Wang, X & Lu, X 2014, ‘Investment in South Sudan: 
The opportunity and the challenge coexist’, People’s Daily, 
April 16,  http://en.people.cn/102774/8599301.html ; Embassy of 
People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Zimbabwe 2011, 
China announces diplomatic ties with South Sudan, 9 July,  http://
www.chinaembassy.org.zw/eng/xwdt/t841090.htm 
7- ‘97 Chinese workers evacuated from South Sudan to Khartoum’ 
2013, People Daily, 25 December,  http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/90883/8495532.html
8- Rose, A & Chen, A 2013, ‘China to evacuate South Su-
dan oil workers to capital’, Reuters, December 20, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/southsudan-unrest-china-
idUKL3N0JZ24K20131220  
9- ‘S. Sudan provides assurances for safety of Chinese oil workers’ 
2015, Sudan Tribune, 15 January,  http://www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article53658
10- Patey, L 2014, ‘South Sudan: fighting could cripple oil industry 
for decades’, Sudan Tribune, 28 January, http://www.sudantribune.
com/spip.php?article49741
11-FOCAC 2012, ‘The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2013-2015)’, 
FOCAC, 23 July,  http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t954620.htm 
the Libyan crisis that resulted in loss of significant Chinese 
investments. In many respects the commitment to peace 
and security in Africa signified a growing recognition 
in China that African intrastate armed conflicts threaten 
its economic interests on the continent. The South Sudan 
intrastate armed conflict was therefore the first test 
to China’s commitment to assist in resolving peace 
and security issues in Africa, and an important platform 
to build its reputation as a responsible global power.
Strategy of ‘parallels’
China’s response to the civil war in South Sudan was 
multidimensional and multifaceted in a way that resembled 
a convoluted strategy based on contradictory elements. 
It combined principle with pragmatism; multilateralism 
with bilateralism; and power politics with mediation. 
The strategy is influenced by Beijing’s desire for flexibility 
and maneuverability in its foreign policy and security 
strategies. Combining different strategies regardless 
of their apparent contradictions, gives China the flexibility 
to balance different interests and still achieve its national 
objectives. For instance, since NATO exceeded its UN 
mandate in Libya, China has grown increasingly wary 
of any purely multilateral arrangements that it does not 
have total control of. In addition, regional political dynamics 
at play among Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda, each of 
whom has divergent interests in South Sudan complicated 
regional multilateral efforts to resolve the conflict in South 
Sudan, hence China’s strategy to balance multilateralism 
with bilateralism - taking care to balance its own interests 
in South Sudan with the diverse interests of the other East 
African regional powers and various stakeholders in the 
civil war. The result was therefore a deliberately convoluted 
strategy of ‘parallels’, giving Beijing enough maneuverability 
to maintain its rhetoric of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other states, while exercising enough influence 
to achieve peace and security. As noted by Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Hong Lei, China’s strategy is to stop wars 
and keep peace, and turn hostilities into friendship “by 
running in parallel peaceful settlement and compulsory 
measures.”12
Principle versus pragmatism
China operates on a principle of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of other states. Civil wars, matters 
of state-society relations, and for instance, engaging 
opposition groups or rebel forces are matters strictly 
ultra vires Beijing’s non-interference principle. China has 
consistently emphasized on this principle to the extent that 
12- People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2016, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press 
Conference on July 20, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1383126.shtml
5African countries now identify China as a non-interfering 
power distinct from interventionist Western powers 
like France and the United States. The implication of this 
non-interfering identity is that Beijing is more constrained 
than the West from taking any action that might be 
considered as interventionist by African countries. 
African countries expect global powers such as the United 
States to intervene in African matters but do not expect 
the same of China. The consequent dilemma for China is, 
therefore, that it can no longer relinquish its non-interfering 
identity without the risk of losing the support of African 
countries. Yet, continued strict adherence to the principle 
has proved, at times, to be detrimental to its interests 
abroad, and international reputation as a responsible 
global power. To avoid losing the trust of African countries 
by being seen as interfering in South Sudan’s internal 
conflict, while at the same avoiding being labelled a ‘free 
rider’ by the United States, or a power unable to protect 
its nationals and businesses abroad, Beijing sought 
to balance the non-interference principle with pragmatism. 
Two weeks after the conflict began on 15 December 
2013, Chinese diplomats including its ambassador 
in Ethiopia met representatives of rebel forces led 
by Riek Machar at a hotel in Addis Ababa. By admission 
of its own Special Envoy for African Affairs, meeting rebels 
of any country is interference into that country’s internal 
affairs. The absence of government representatives 
of South Sudan at the Addis Ababa meeting raised 
concerns that the meeting had other objectives besides 
mediation. One of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) mediators in the South Sudan conflict 
thinks China used the meeting to achieve two objectives, 
first to get assurances from Riek Machar whose forces 
had taken over control of oilfields in Unity and Upper 
Nile State that Chinese investments were secure. 
The Upper Nile and Unity State oilfields are strategic to 
China, the government of Sudan and Riek Machar rebel 
forces because, as put by Luke Patey, they represented 
80% and 20% of oil production, respectively. Secondly, 
the meeting was used by Chinese diplomats to gather 
information and intelligence on the goings on in South 
Sudan in order to determine its course of action, 
and possibly which side of the conflict to support. 
Bilateralism and multilateralism
In Africa, China seems to prefer bilateral rather than 
multilateral cooperation. At the 2009 Fourth Ministerial 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Libya’s 
then Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa complained 
about China’s ‘divide and rule’ of African countries. 
He remonstrated that Beijing does “not want the African 
Union, or African unity, but rather China wants to cooperate 
with Africa as separate nations, rather than as a union…”13 
A major reason why China prefers dealing with separate 
countries is that bilateralism and multilateralism are not 
clearly defined in China’s foreign policy. In terms of China’s 
position paper on the New Security Concept, cooperation 
“should be flexible and diversified in form and model. 
It could be a multilateral security mechanism of relatively 
strong binding force or a forum-like multi-lateral security 
dialogue. It could also be a confidence-building bilateral 
security dialogue or a non-governmental dialogue 
of an academic nature. The promotion of greater 
interaction of economic interests is another effective means 
of safeguarding security.” The implication is that for China, 
bilateral security dialogue is included in its conception 
of cooperation, thus obscuring the line between 
bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. Based 
on that position, in South Sudan, China pursued both, 
improvising, extending and merging bilateral negotiations 
with multilateral negotiations to achieve its national 
interests. 
Accordingly, Beijing has engaged with IGAD to the extent 
that IGAD facilitates its bilateral negotiations with South 
Sudan for the safety of Chinese nationals and businesses. 
For example, in January 2015, China facilitated 
a meeting attended by foreign ministers of China, Sudan, 
South Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as representatives 
of Riek Machar in Khartoum, Sudan under the ‘Special 
Consultation in Support of South Sudan Peace Process’ 
led by IGAD. At the end of the meeting South Sudan’s 
Foreign Minister Barnaba Benjamin said: “we welcome 
the Chinese role which we believe is constructive 
and seeks to resolve the conflict in South Sudan. 
We hope these consultations, under China’s patronage, 
would put the IGAD-led negotiations on the right track.”14 
Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister said that 
“we have no objection toward what China is doing and we 
believe the Chinese role is in the interest of the initiative of 
the IGAD which is patronizing the negotiations between 
the two conflicting parties in South Sudan.”15 The same 
sentiments were echoed by Sudan’s Foreign Minister Ali 
Karti who pointed out that “China, as a permanent member 
state in the UN Security Council, is working seriously 
and sincerely to end the conflict in South Sudan. It 
is acting on the base of its international responsibility 
and not to achieve any other purposes.”16 Albeit, China’s 
main objective at the meeting was to get guarantees 
that Chinese national and oil installations were going 
to be secured. This raised concerns among other IGAD 
member states that China was using IGAD’s good offices 
to protect its interests. Similarly, there were rumours 
that China had also tried to negotiate with the UN that 
Chinese peacekeepers be deployed to protect Chinese oil 
investments. 
13- Al-Awsat, A 2009, ‘Q & A with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa 
Kusa’, Asharq al-Awsat, 10 November, viewed 18 May 2014, 
http://english.aawsat.com/2009/11/article55252921 ; Hook, L & 
Dyer, G 2011, ‘Chinese oil interests attacked in Libya’, Financial 
Times, 24 February, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eef58d52-3fe2-
11e0-811f-00144feabdc0.html
14- ‘China-supported consultations reactivate peace process in 
S. Sudan’ 2015, China Daily, 13 January, http://usa.chinadaily.
com.cn/world/2015-01/13/content_19304551_2.htm
15- Ibid.
16- ‘China-supported consultations in Khartoum reactivate peace 
process in South Sudan’, Xinhua, 13 January, http://news.xinhua-
net.com/english/china/2015-01/13/c_133915537.htm
6A Norwegian diplomat in Addis Ababa who participated 
in the IGAD meetings on South Sudan dismissed China’s 
presence in IGAD as a nuisance, arguing that they never 
meaningfully contributed to the peace deliberations. 
He suspected they only came to the meetings to gather 
information and keep abreast with latest developments 
in South Sudan’s conflict. The same remarks were 
recounted by several IGAD officials and diplomats 
from Uganda. For instance, in an interview, an IGAD official 
complained that although China was heavily involved 
in the mediation process and peace monitoring mechanism 
and had seconded some Chinese officials to be part of the 
peace monitoring mechanism, Beijing allegedly provided 
funds off the record to rebels to protect their investments. 
Her argument was that China was in IGAD simply to protect 
its oil investments. However, she quickly added that Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda also had interests in South 
Sudan. Nevertheless, as admitted by Zhong Jianhua, 
the Chinese government’s Special Representative 
for African Affairs from 2013 to 2016, mediation of African 
intrastate armed conflicts in multilateral frameworks 
was still a new experience for China therefore they often 
struggled to balance their interests with the common 
objective of bringing peace to South Sudan. 
Mediation and Power Politics
China also combined mediation with power politics, 
exercising its economic preponderance in South Sudan 
and leveraging on the asymmetrical relations between 
the two countries to achieve its objectives. To enhance its 
mediation efforts in South Sudan, China promptly appointed 
a special envoy, Zhong Jianhua, a diplomat considered 
to have extensive knowledge of Sudan and South Sudan. 
In a statement, foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua 
Chunying said: “On behalf of the Chinese government, 
special envoy Zhong Jianhua is currently visiting South 
Sudan and neighboring countries, and actively carrying 
out mediation efforts. China is willing to continuously 
enhance communication and coordination with all 
the relevant parties and jointly push for restoration of stability 
in South Sudan.”17 As a result of the negotiations, the first 
ceasefire agreement between South Sudan’s warring 
parties was signed. However, it has been noted by Harry 
Verhoeven that “Chinese diplomats took unprecedented 
steps in publicly pressuring belligerents Salva Kiir and his 
former vice president, Riek Machar, to sign a ceasefire 
agreement.”18 
A common feature in China’s mediation efforts 
and bilateral talks with South Sudan government officials 
and rebel forces was demand for protection of its assets 
and economic investments. For instance, following reports 
of rebel attacks on oil facilities, the South Sudanese 
17- ‘China sends envoy to South Sudan to push peace talks’ 2013, 
Voice of America, 27 December,  http://www.voanews.com/content/
reu-china-sends-envoy-south-sudan-push-peace-talks/1818388.
html
18- Verhoeven, H 2014, ‘Is Beijing’s non-interference policy 
history? How Africa is changing China’, The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 37, No.2, p. 64.
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) announced on 16 
January 2015 that “oil fields have never been under control 
of anybody. They have been under full control of the SPLA 
and the general command assured the oil companies 
in Adar and Faluj that their protection is 100%.”19 
That announcement was a response to pressure 
from China, which had demanded an assurance 
at a meeting held in Khartoum between China’s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi and his South Sudanese 
counterpart, Barnaba Mariel Benjamin that South 
Sudan was committed to protecting Chinese oil workers 
and assets. According to the South Sudanese Minister 
of Information, Michael Makuei Leuth the meeting 
was initiated by China and was attended by members 
of the opposition faction led by former president Riek 
Machar. After the meeting, Barnaba Mariel Benjamin told 
the media that “I think it is a very, very important thing – 
that they (the Chinese) wanted the assurance that these 
institutions are properly protected and not to be destroyed 
in any form.”20 The assurances were a confirmation 
of earlier commitments made in a telephone conversation 
on 14 April 2014 when the Foreign Minister of South Sudan, 
Barnaba Marial Benjamin, China’s Minister of Commerce, 
Gao Hucheng stated that Chinese enterprises were still 
operating in South Sudan and that the “government 
of South Sudan could take forceful measures to protect 
the safety of lives and properties of Chinese people and 
enterprises, and render more facilitation and guarantee for 
business production and operation, material transportation 
and personnel entry and exit.”21 The use of language that 
seem to imply a command to South Sudan’s government to 
“take forceful measures to protect” Chinese nationals and 
assets in South Sudan suggests a more assertive China 
confident in its ability to pressure the Juba government into 
protecting its economic interests. 
As noted by Luke Patey, the author of The New Kings 
of Crude: China, India and the Global Struggle for Oil in 
Sudan and South Sudan, “China’s concern regarding 
South Sudan is not energy per se but rather a corporate 
investment from a major Chinese national oil company 
in jeopardy.”22 Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s had refuted 
that notion arguing that “China’s mediation of South 
Sudan issues is completely the responsibility and duty 
of a responsible power, and not because of China’s own 
interests.”23 While that might have been part of the reason, 
the major one was, as he had admitted earlier that “war 
and conflicts hurt the oil industry…, an area in which 
China, Sudan and South Sudan have worked closely 
19- “South Sudan army says oil fields under full protection” 2015, 
Sudan Tribune, January 18, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.
php?article53675
20- S. Sudan provides assurances for safety of Chinese oil workers’ 
2015, Sudan Tribune, 15 January,  http://www.sudantribune.com/
spip.php?article53658
21- People’s Republic of China Ministry of Commerce 2014, 
Minister Gao Hucheng holds telephone talks with South Sudan’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on bi-
lateral ties and cooperation, 6 April,  http://english.mofcom.gov.
cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201404/20140400553492.
shtml
22- Feng, B 2014, ‘China to send its first infantry troops to U.N. 
Mission in South Sudan’, New York Times, December 23,  http://
sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/china-to-send-its-first-
infantry-troops-to-u-n-mission-in-south-sudan/?_r=0
23- ‘China’s motive in South Sudan?’ 2015, Al Jazeera, January 
23, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2015/01/
china-motive-south-sudan-201511319545502114.html
7together.”24 He had then argued that the mediation was 
not meant for China to benefit alone - it was a mutually 
beneficial intervention aimed at getting a win-win solution 
to the conflict. It was therefore apparent that China’s 
efforts toward direct mediation in the South Sudan civil 
war “runs parallel with its interest in ensuring billions 
of oil investments in South Sudan stay out of harm’s way.”25 
This was confirmed by Ma Qiang, the Chinese Ambassador 
to South Sudan, who told Reuters that “we have huge 
interests in South Sudan so we have to make a greater 
effort to persuade the two sides to stop fighting and agree 
to a ceasefire.”26 
To force the belligerents in South Sudan to cease fire, 
and in a marked departure from its “business is business, 
no politics involved” precept that it had used to defend 
weapon sales to Khartoum, in the case of South Sudan, 
China took a more assertive but firm position. It halted 
the sale of US$38 million worth of arms to South Sudan 
government by its state-owned arms manufacturer, 
China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO). 
According to Lan Kun, an attaché at the Chinese 
Embassy in Juba, the Chinese government decided it was 
not appropriate to deliver the consignment of weapons 
to South Sudan, therefore “no more weapons are heading 
to South Sudan… There are some media reports that 
were alleging that the Chinese government was behind 
this business operation and wants to undermine this peace 
process. That is totally untrue.”27 Chief of the Political 
Section at the Embassy of China in South Sudan reiterated 
that since the beginning of the armed conflict, the Chinese 
government ordered all relevant Chinese companies 
to halt weapon trade with South Sudan28. The South 
China Morning Post described China’s embargo on sale 
of weapons to Juba by Chinese companies as indicative 
of a swap of “its reserved diplomacy for a hands-on 
approach to help resolve a… rebellion in South Sudan that 
threatens Beijing’s oil investments.”29 In addition, Beijing 
creatively fitted its South Sudan mediation within its foreign 
policy objective of sustaining its economic development 
and protecting overseas citizens and national interests 
from external threats, of which the intrastate armed conflict 
in South Sudan was one. The explanation was sufficient 
to silence dissenting voices in China, reassure Chinese 
citizens worried that the Libyan experience was going 
to be repeated in South Sudan, but most importantly, 
the message preempted concerns in Africa that China was 
moving toward intervention in African countries’ internal affairs.
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Conclusion
In post-independence Africa, South Sudan seems to 
have provided China with some unfettered testing ground 
for its foreign policy and security strategies. Seeking to 
maintain its cordial relations with developing countries 
such as South Sudan that are riddled with political 
instability while at the same time safeguarding its national 
interests (Chinese national and companies operating in 
those countries), China’s intervention, camouflaged in 
the non-interference rhetoric has allowed it to intervene 
in the internal armed conflict in South Sudan in a non-
threatening manner. It has also shown less restraint 
in using its economic preponderance to dictate terms. 
Using its dominance in the South Sudan oil sector, 
and South Sudan’s reliance on China for revenue, 
China was able to compel the warring parties in South 
Sudan to guarantee protection of its assets and oil-facilities. 
It also used its leverage on South Sudan to persuade Riek 
Machar and Salva Kiir to sign the first peace agreement 
on 23 January 2014, and played a key role in further 
peace negotiations. In addition, it consistently restrained 
the U.S from imposing sanctions on actors in South 
Sudan arguing that such action would be detrimental 
to peace talks. Combined, these efforts reflected China’s 
impact in attempting to end the civil war in South Sudan. 
But intensified competition for power in Juba, ethnicisation 
of the conflict, multiplicity of rebel factions fighting against 
the government and each other, and meddling by Kenya 
and Uganda in the civil war is gradually waning China’s 
impact in ending the civil war in South Sudan, confining 
its role to UN peacekeeping operations. 
Nonetheless, the strategy of balancing principle with 
pragmatism, mediation with power politics, and 
bilateralism with multilateralism has to a greater extent 
enabled China to revise its engagement strategy 
with African countries in conflict. The apparent effect of the 
strategy is that Beijing is subtly but creatively employing 
its economic, political and diplomatic influence on African 
states and critical stakeholders to determine the duration, 
direction and outcomes of their intrastate armed conflicts. 
Thus, as more conflicts in Africa impinge on China’s 
interests, China is likely to be more proactive and assertive 
to ensure that conditions remain favorable to its nationals 
and businesses. China is therefore no longer defined 
by its historical non-interference policy that most African 
countries are still obsessed with. As its global interests 
expand and its security concerns simultaneously increase, 
China will likely be taking more assertive action that borders 
on intervention.  
